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VOLUME 47 FALL, 1961 NUMBER 1
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 20TH
CENTURY UNDER AN 18TH-CENTURY
CONSTITUTION*
J. William Fulbrightt
In a world beset by unparalleled forces of revolution and upheaval,
we Americans are confronted with the painful and urgent duty of
re-examining the functional adequacy of some of our most hollowed
and hitherto unquestioned institutions. The question we face is whether
our basic constitutional machinery, admirably suited to the needs of
a remote agrarian republic in the 18th century, is adequate for the
formulation and conduct of the foreign policy of a 20th-century nation,
pre-eminent in political and military power and burdened with all the
enormous responsibilities that accompany such power.
I raise this question with a feeling of sadness and more than a touch
of historical nostalgia. The delicate and complex structure of federal
decentralization, and of checks and balances on the national level,
have served this heterogeneous nation well in its internal life, restraining
us from hasty and ill-conceived actions and protecting us from the
tyranny of both individual men and fervent majorities. Except for
the tragic Civil War of a century ago, we have had a remarkably success-
ful history. The system has proven durable and has served as a
framework within which we have been able to provide a good life for
most of our people.
I emphasize that this system has served us well in our internal life,
and if our life as a nation were essentially domestic and not irrev-
ocably linked to the life of the other peoples on this planet, no questions
would have to be raised. At least since 1917, however, and for perhaps
a good deal longer, our internal and external affairs have become in-
creasingly interwoven; meanwhile, the ability of this nation to preserve
the value system which constitutes the core of our national interest
* This article was delivered as the sixth Robert S. Stevens Lecture at Cornell University
on May 5, 1961.
t See contributors' section, masthead, p. 69, for biographical data.
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has come to depend principally upon our ability to cope with world-
wide revolutionary forces.
The dynamic forces of the 20th century-communism, fascism, aggres-
sive nationalism, and the explosive awakening of long quiescent peoples-
are growing more and more unmanageable under the procedures of
leisurely deliberation which are built into our constitutional system. To
cope with these forces we must be able to act quickly and decisively on
the one hand, and persistently and patiently on the other. We must
make decisions which are painful and some which do violence to our
fundamental values. We must do these things if we are to survive
in a world that obstinately refuses to conduct its affairs under Anglo-
Saxon rules of measured and orderly procedure.
My question, then, is whether we have any choice but to modify,
and perhaps overhaul, the 18th-century procedures that govern the
formulation and conduct of American foreign policy. More specifically,
I wonder whether the time has not arrived, or indeed already passed,
when we must give the Executive a measure of power in the conduct of
our foreign affairs that we have hitherto jealously withheld.
The source of an effective foreign policy under our system is Presi-
dential power. This proposition, valid in our own time, is certain
to become more, rather than less, compelling in the decades ahead.
The pre-eminence of Presidential leadership overrides the most logical
and ingenious administrative and organizational schemes. The essence of
our "policy-making machinery" and of the "decision-making process"
-- concepts of current vogue in the academic world-is the President
himself who is neither a machine nor a process, but a living human
being whose effectiveness is principally a function of his own knowl-
edge, wisdom, vision, and authority. It is not within our powers to
confer wisdom or perception on the Presidential person. It is within
our power to grant or deny him authority. It is my contention that
for the existing requirements of American foreign policy we have
hobbled the President by too niggardly a grant of power.
Our institutional arrangements for foreign affairs were drafted in the
late 18th century by men who assumed that these affairs would be
few and insignificant. The Founding Fathers considered, for instance,
that the Department of State would quite possibly wither away from
disuse. Nonetheless, these .men, deeply imbued with the philosophy
that no man is beyond the corrupting influences of power, carefully
restricted the authority of the President by the prerogatives of "advice
and consent" vested in the Senate, and by the still broader limitations
of the legislative process as a whole. As foreign policy has become
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increasingly merged with domestic policy, and as its conduct has
increasingly involved the expenditure of vast sums, Congressional
authority, particularly that of the House of Representatives, has been
accordingly enhanced. It is exceedingly difficult-if not impossible-
to devise unified policies oriented to a clear and definite conception of
the national interest through a system in which power and responsibility
for foreign policy are "shared and overlapping." Policies thus evolved
are likely to be ill-co-ordinated, short-ranged, and often unsuccessful,
while the responsibility for failure is placed squarely on the President,
neither "shared" nor "overlapping." As President Kennedy said re-
cently: "Success has many fathers; failure is an orphan." He might
have added that every President finds himself the involuntary pro-
prietor of a vast, unruly orphanage.
The President already enjoys far greater authority in foreign affairs
than in domestic policy, but it is still authority that falls short of his
responsibilities. The President, according to the Supreme Court in
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,' is vested with "delicate,
plenary, and exclusive powers", in the conduct of foreign affairs. While
it is not for me to query the juridical basis of this dictum, I do not think
that it is accurate in fact.
The pre-eminent responsibility of the President for the formulation
and conduct of American foreign policy is clear and unalterable. He has,
as Alexander Hamilton defined it, all powers in international affairs
"which the Constitution does not vest elsewhere in clear terms." He
possesses sole authority to communicate and negotiate with foreign
powers. He controls the external aspects of the Nation's power, which
can be moved by his will alone-the armed forces, the diplomatic corps,
the Central Intelligence Agency, and all of the vast executive apparatus.
As Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, the President has full
responsibility, which cannot be shared, for military decisions in a
world in which the difference between safety and cataclysm can be a
matter of hours or even minutes. The President is the symbol of the
nation to the external world, the leader of a vast alliance of free nations,
and the prime mover in shaping a national consensus on foreign
policy. It is important to note, however, that while this responsibility
is indeed very broad, his authority is often infringed upon or thwarted
in practice by unauthorized persons.
Each new President, on taking office, inherits a complete foreign
policy in being, with roots as far back in the past as Washington's
Farewell Address and the Monroe Doctrine. He must preserve, imple-
1 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
1961]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
ment, and-in our own time-frequently reshape these broad lines
of policy, taking care not to violate the deep psychological bases of
our "national character," or what Walt Rostow calls the "national style."
The President's power is informally but effectively checked by the
workings-or, more precisely, the non-workings--of the sprawling
administrative apparatus of government, with its complex subdivisions
and overlapping jurisdictions. The Department of State, it is esti-
mated, participates in a vast number of inter-departmental committees
dealing with problems of foreign policy. The road between a Presidential
directive and its practical implementation is long and tortuous. The
complexity and seemingly built-in inertia of the bureaucracy make it
much easier and much safer on the operative level to continue time-
honored routines than to embark upon new initiatives. It is much
easier and much safer to pursue policies which proved to be successful
ten years ago, but which have been made obsolete by recent events,
than to try to meet recent events by novel and perhaps risky policy
changes.
In a statement before/the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
in 1959, Professor Hans J. Morgenthau summed up the situation in
these words:
The executive branch of the government is constituted in such a way,
particularly with regard to the conduct of foreign policy, as to make it
virtually impossible to pursue consistently a dynamic foreign policy which
takes the initiative away from the enemy and which is mobile enough
to answer effectively sudden challenges which may confront us.
Calling for drastic simplification of the processes of bureaucracy,
Professor Morgenthau declared:
I think it is not by accident that Mr. Dulles to a great extent disregarded
the institutional processes of foreign policy formulation and reached many
important decisions without reference to them. It is the only thing he
could have done when he was confronted with a task which required
immediate decision.
The principal subordinate of the President in the foreign policy
process is, of course, the Secretary of State. The Office of the Secretary
of State, unlike its counterpart in most parliamentary democracies, is
scarcely defined in institutional terms. The Secretary is the creature of
the President, with as extensive or restricted powers as the President
may choose to give him. The President can take his counsel from whom-
soever he chooses. President Wilson, for example, relied heavily on
Colonel House, who held no official position, and virtually ignored
Secretary Lansing, whom he neither liked nor trusted. President
Roosevelt relied little on Secretary Hull and was in great measure
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"his own Secretary of State." Under President Eisenhower, on the
other hand, Secretary Dulles seemed at times to be exercising those
"delicate, plenary, and exclusive powers" which are supposed to be
vested in the President.
The lack of clear institutionalization in the office of the Secretary of
State, as well as the absence of a continuing corps of high-level pro-
fessionals in the Department of State, in sufficient numbers and quality,
add a most deplorable element of disorder and amateurism to the
inherent defects of an overly complex bureaucracy.
The overriding problem of inadequate Presidential authority in
foreign affairs, however, derives not from the internal relationships
within the executive branch, but from the "checks and balances" of
Congressional authority in foreign relations. While Congress has many
powers under the Constitution, having to do with foreign affairs, these
powers do not enable the Congress to initiate or shape foreign policy,
but to implement, modify, or thwart the proposals of the President.
These powers, moreover, are widely dispersed within Congress, dis-
tributed among autonomous committees each under a chairman who
owes little if anything in the way of political obligation to the President.
Besides the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, the principal centers of foreign policy
power in Congress are the Armed Services and Appropriations Com-
mittees in each House. The Appropriations Committees are particularly
sensitive to the preservation of their prerogatives against executive
incursions, with the result that it is all but impossible to secure funds
on a long-range basis. The Mutual Program, one of the keystones of
our foreign policy, is put in jeopardy annually by the lengthy ritual
of hearings, debates, and amendments to the President's proposals.
The Secretary of State and other high officials are obliged to expend
prodigious amounts of time and energy in shepherding their programs
through the glacial legislative process. For any given program, an
Administration spokesman must usually appear four times before
Congressional units, before the authorizing Committees of each House
and then before the two Appropriations Committees.
The appropriations process in Congress, moreover, is governed by a
basically faulty attitude. The central consideration is invariably money
rather than policy. The annual debate on foreign aid is focused on the
single question: How much money ought we to spend? Instead the
truly vital question should be: What kind of policy ought we to have?
It is policy that should be determined first, and this determination should
provide us with the rationale by which it is decided how much we ought
1961]
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to spend. As Professor Morgenthau said when he testified before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1959:
If you ask me how much money we ought to spend, I couldn't tell you.
I would say we ought to spend sufficient money to keep India going. This
might be twice as much as we are willing to appropriate or half as much.
I wouldn't know ...
These difficulties are further compounded by the premium which
our political system places on localism and parochialism. Foreign
policy is scarcely ever the crucial factor in the election of Congressmen.
The rise of a successful politician to power in the United States be-
speaks an impressive measure of skill in two areas: the ability to
satisfy the domestic needs and desires of a substantial portion of our
citizenry, and the ability to manipulate political machinery with
shrewdness and deftness. At no point in his rise to powerful office does
the typically successful politician find it imperative to school himself
in the requirements and problems of foreign policy. Indeed his pre-
occupation with local matters and with political machinery is virtually
bound to prevent him from acquiring any breadth or depth of knowl-
edge in the field of foreign affairs.
With their excessively parochial orientation, Congressmen are acutely
sensitive to the influence of private pressure and to the excesses and
inadequacies of a public opinion that is all too often ignorant of the
needs, the dangers, and the opportunities in our foreign relations. Walter
Lippmann, as astute an observer of the political process as we have
in American journalism, contends that public opinion consistently lags
a generation behind in its attitudes and assessments of international
relations. The tyranny of public opinion, says Lippmann, imposes
upon our policy-makers a "compulsion to make mistakes." The poet
Yeats was not wholly wrong when he laid down this harsh pronounce-
ment on public opinion: "The best lack all conviction-the worst are
filled with passionate intensity."
These views may be overstated, but they are not wholly without merit,
and I point to them in order to stress the point that public opiniop
must be educated and led if it is to bolster a wise and effective foreign
policy. Only the President can provide the guidance that is neces-
sary, while legislators display a distressing tendency- to adhere to the
dictates of public opinion, or at least to its vocal and organized segments.
I return now to my basic question: Are our formal political institutions
basically inadequate for the requirements of our foreign policy? Harlan
Cleveland, former Dean of the Maxwell School of Citizenship and
Public Affairs at Syracuse and now Assistant Secretary of State for
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International Organization Affairs, stated the problem succinctly when
he commented: "We know in our hearts that we are in the world for
keeps, yet we are still tackling twenty-year problems with five-year
plans staffed with two-year personnel with one-year appropriations."
And there is wisdom for the present in Abraham Lincoln's words:
The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate for the stormy present. The
occasion is piled high with difficulty and we must rise with the occasion.
As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew. We must
disenthrall ourselves and then we shall save our country.
The question I put, without presuming to offer solutions, is whether
in the face of the harsh necessities of the 1960's we can afford the
luxury of 18th century procedures of measured deliberation. It is
highly unlikely that we can successfully execute a long-range pro-
gram for the taming, or containing, of today's aggressive and revolu-
tionary forces by continuing to leave vast and vital decision-making
powers in the hands of a decentralized, independent-minded, and largely
parochial-minded body of legislators. The Congress, as Woodrow
Wilson put it, is a "disintegrated ministry," a jealous center of power
with a built-in antagonism for the Executive.
I have no objection to this arrangement in its own terms, and I
wish that the conditions of tranquility in which this system flourished
were still in existence. They are not, however, and I submit that
the price of democratic survival in a world of aggressive totalitar-
ianism is to give up some of the democratic luxuries of the past.
We should do so with no illusions as to the reasons for its necessity.
It is distasteful and dangerous to vest the executive with powers un-
checked and unbalanced. My question is whether we have any choice
but to do so.
Another aspect of the question of the appropriateness of our institu-
tional structure for the effective formulation and conduct of our foreign
policy is the dual role which the President of the United States is com-
pelled to fill. He is both head of state and head of government, both
King and Prime Minister. If he fails to fulfill the requirements of either
of these roles with skill and success, he seriously jeopardizes his effective-
ness in the other. President Truman was in many respects a forceful and
imaginative head of government, but his failure to make his own person
a living symbol of the unity and dignity of the nation contributed to the
unbridled partisanship of the early fifties which did grave damage to both
his foreign and domestic policies. President Eisenhower, on the other
hand, was an exemplary head of state, a virtual personification of the
American ideal, but his failure to exercise the full measure of his powers
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and duties as "Prime Minister" was the cause of basic failures and omis-
sions in our foreign policy. President Roosevelt was relieved, because of
his physical afflictions, from some of the ceremonial duties required of
other Presidents, with the result that he was probably a more effective
head of government for this very reason.
Perhaps it is too much to ask one man to formulate and execute
national policy, both foreign and domestic, and at the same time to
preside benignly over the opening of the baseball season, to present
an award to the outstanding boy scout of the year, to crown a beauty
queen, and to participate enthusiastically in very ceremonial aspect
of our national life.
In neither the parliamentary nor totalitarian systems of government
is the Executive called upon to exercise this dual function. While the
President's time is consumed and his efforts diluted by innumerable
diversions of ceremony, such world leaders as Macmillan and Khrushchev
and Mao Tse-tung are able to focus the full weight of their formidable
talents and energy on the charting of national policy. I believe we
should find some way to relieve the President of the burdens and
diversions of ceremony. I do not know exactly how, or even whether,
this can be done, but I submit that we should try to devise some mieans
of divorcing the duties of the King from those of the Prime Minister.
Let me consider briefly some of the contrasting techniques of policy
formation utilized by both friendly and hostile foreign powers.
The outstanding characteristic of the British parliamentary system,
by contrast with our own, is the single line of power and responsibility for
the initiative, execution, and control of national policy that runs from
the Prime Minister and the Party leadership through the Cabinet and
Parliament. With a disciplined party majority in the House of Commons,
a British Prime Minister can count upon solid legislative support in
virtually all aspects of policy. The Cabinet itself is collectively re-
sponsible to Parliament and must give regular accounts of its steward-
ship through weekly "question hours."
Besides the immense advantages of unified control and responsibility,
the Prime Minister is free of the burdens of ceremony and ritual, which
are admirably borne by the Queen. The Prime Minister need not take
even the time to deliver his own "state of the union message." The
Queen performs this service in her annual "Speech from the Throne."
The Prime Minister has final responsibility for the formulation and
conduct of British foreign policy, and, unlike the President, he has
commensurate authority.
In comparing the powers of the Prime Minister and the President
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of the United States, the President would appear to have two advan-
tages. He has, first of all, a fixed term of office, no matter how unpopu-
lar he may be with Congress or with the voters, he has the constitutional
right to retain his office and exercise its powers until the next quadren-
nial election. The second apparent advantage is that the President is
supreme within his Cabinet, which has no constitutional status and need
not be consulted at all by the President.
Both of these advantages lose a good deal in practice. While the
Prime Minister is technically subject to a Parliamentary expression
of "no confidence," any Prime Minister who enters office with a safe
party majority is, to all intents and purposes, as sure of his five years
in office as the President is of his four. And if the Prime Minister is
more restricted by the views of his Cabinet colleagues, he is nonethe-
less usually in a position to exercise preponderant influence in Cabinet
deliberations. The Prime Minister's most significant advantage over the
President is the extent of his control over Parliament, which, far
from being a co-equal partner, is for legislative purposes virtually
an assembly under his control.
British foreign policy on the operational level has two distinct ad-
vantages over its American counterpart: a Foreign Secretary who
occupies an institutionally defined and constitutionally sanctioned office
and a professionalized Foreign Office with built-in procedures for con-
tinuity of administration regardless of changes of government.
While the American Secretary of State is directly responsible to the
President and to no one else, serves only at his pleasure, and may
be overridden by the President at any time, the British Foreign Secre-
tary is usually a major political figure in his own right with a long
experience and thorough knowledge of the Parliament, ranking high
in his party, and being constitutionally responsible to the Cabinet and
Parliament as well as to the Prime Minister. The power exercised by
the Secretary of State essentially depends on the personality and will
of the President. No British Foreign Secretary, on the other hand, has
been or could be relegated to quite the ignominy that Lansing suffered
under Wilson, or could exercise such great authority as did John
Foster Dulles. There are, of course, variations. Anthony Eden played
a decidedly secondary role under Churchill, much as Hull did under
Roosevelt, but the office and position of Foreign Secretary remain
relatively stable.
A change of Administrations in the United States is accompanied by
a radical re-staffing of the top policy positions in the Department of
State. The result is a periodical infusion of officials often inexperienced
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in the exercise of governmental power and responsibility. In Britain,
on the other hand, a high degree of administrative continuity and pro-
fessionalism is assured by the existence of a Permanent Under-Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs, who serves as the head of the corps of
permanent officials, including the Foreign Service, and who holds
office regardless of changes of government. The Permanent Under-
Secretary is always at the right hand of a new Foreign Secretary to
advise him in the intricacies and prospects of current issues and in the
assembling of information and documentation, and to caution him
against courses of action which might depart from historic policies or
lead the nation into unwarranted or dangerous commitments.
By contrast with Great Britain, the United States suffers from
chronic amateurism among the men who bear the chief burdens of
decision-making and foreign policy execution. Many of our policy
makers have acquired wisdom and vision in the conduct of foreign af-
fairs, but it has all too often been by on-the-job training. Under present
circumstances, the conduct of our foreign policy requires an infusion of
rigorous professionalism. The trials and errors of untried leaders were
of little moment to the affairs of an isolated republic in the 19th century.
In the mid-twentieth century, the errors and vacillations of amateurism
can quite readily lead to irretrievable, indeed cataclysmic, disasters.
Further light may be thrown on the inadequacies of American foreign
policy procedures by an attempt to penetrate the Alice-in-Wonderland
fagade of Communist institutions with a view to locating the true
centers of power in Moscow and Peking.
While the elaborate structure of Soviet "institutions" is replete with
checks and obstacles, by contrast with which the American Constitution
is a monument of efficiency, these inconveniences are evaded by the
simple and effective expedient of overriding institutional obstacles
wherever they interfere with the dictates of policy, which is practically
everywhere.
The institutions of the state in both the Soviet Union and Communist
China are subordinate at all levels to the parallel institutions of the
Communist Party, which in turn are subordinate to the will and dynamic
personal intoraction of a few powerful men exercising undefined and
virtually unlimited powers.
The centralization of power in the Presidium of the Communist
Party is the overriding characteristic of the Soviet system. Such policy
decisions as are deemed appropriate are reported to the representative
organs of the Party and state, either for information and propaganda
purposes or for the formality of automatic approval. The Presidium
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in fact is a self-perpetuating body of individuals who, though nominally
"elected" by the Central Committee, hold their positions by virtue
of their administrative ability, their prowess in the internal political
struggles and intrigues of the Kremlin, and their loyalty to the current
dictator.
The operations of the Presidium, unlike those of a Western Cabinet,
must be understood almost entirely in personal rather than insti-
tutional terms. The overriding objective in the shaping of policy, both
foreign and domestic, is to get the job done, and if machinery or legal
red tape poses obstructions, it is ignored or overridden.
From his vantage point at the apex of both party and government
hierarchies, reinforced by his unmeasurable personal authority, Khrush-
chev exercises virtually unrestricted control of Soviet foreign policy.
He does not rule in the high-handed fashion of Stalin, being by nature
gregarious, extroverted, and garrulous, and he appears to have delegated
substantial authority to trusted subordinates. Mikoyan, for example,
is Khrushchev's closest adviser in foreign affairs. In addition to his
pre-eminent political power in a totally centralized system, Khrushchev
has also proclaimed himself to be chief of state, a ceremonial dignity
which he finds convenient in his visits to foreign countries.
One would suppose that these all-encompassing powers and duties
would impose upon Khrushchev a far heavier burden of detail and
ceremony than those which afflict the President of the United States,
but such is not the case. For reasons which are not wholly clear,
Khrushchev finds ample time to reflect at leisure on the goals and means
of Soviet policy. Waiter Lippmann reports that during his recent
Soviet visit, he was received by Khrushchev for an interview that
lasted eight hours, during which time the Chairman was troubled by
no' interruptions and appeared to be completely relaxed and free from
the distractions which plague our high officials.
The evidence is thus impressive that while the Soviet leader has
virtually unlimited authority to act vigorously and decisively, to change
courses with dispatch, and to focus the vast resources of the Soviet
Union on any objective which he deems pre-eminent; he also has the
time and the temperament that allow him to think and talk at length and
to chart long-range policy goals.
What is true of the Soviet Union and Khrushchev appears to be even
more true of Communist China and Mao Tse-tung. Like its Soviet
counterpart, the Chinese Communist Party has absorbed the elaborate
institutions of state, and pre-eminent power is lodged in the Party
Politburo, the equivalent of the Soviet Party Presidium. Within the
1961]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
Politburo there is a standing committee composed of the highest ranking
members of the larger body. The leadership of this inner core consists
of Mao Tse-tung, First Secretary of the Party, Liu Shao-chi, Chairman
of the Republic, and Chou En-lai, Premier of the Government. These
three men, and especially Mao, hold in their hands the real nucleus of
power in Communist China.
Mao feels that his all-important position in policy formulation
requires freedom from administration and ceremonial tasks. In 1959
he gave up the office of Chairman of the Republic and he now holds no
position in government, allowing himself ample time for the consideration
and reflective thinking that he regards as the essential prerequisite to
sound policy formulation. In recent years he has apparently made
very little attempt to intervene in matters of detail and has for the
most part left the execution of programs to his trusted subordinates.
Confronted with adversaries who are thus able to focus unrestrained
personal power and vast resources on the advancement of a grand
design that, if realized, will mean the destruction of free institutions
in the United States and throughout the world, the President of the
United States is obliged to organize and lead the defense of the free
world through the use of institutions and processes that were designed
for a radically different world of almost two centuries ago. I do not
contend that we should abandon these institutions, for their preserva-
tion constitutes the very core of our national interest. Nor do I offer
at this juncture a blueprint for the overhaul of our national policy
machinery. I do contend, however,-very urgently-that the American
people and their leaders must give prompt and serious thought to the
need for major changes in the cumbersome procedures of our foreign
policy formulation.
As the leader of a beleaguered community of free nations, the United
States is under the most pressing compulsion to form wise and far-
sighted policies, oriented to a clearly conceived concept of the national
interest and implemented by carefully devised and firmly co-ordinated
specific lines of action. The essence of this compulsion is the conferral
of greatly increased authority on the President, coupled with relief
from many of his ceremonial duties. The President alone can act
to mobilize our power and resources toward the realization of clearly
defined objectives and to wean the American people and their represent-
atives from the luxuries of parochialism and self-indulgence that they
can no longer afford. The enhancement of Presidential power is, as
I have said, a disagreeable and dangerous prospect. It is seen to be
a compelling necessity, however, when set against the alternative of
[Vol. 47
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immobility, which can only lead to consequences immeasurably more
disagreeable and dangerous.
Even in the 1830's, De Tocqueville was able to say:
Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which a democracy
possesses; and they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all
those faculties in which it is deficient . . . a democracy is unable to
regulate the details of an important undertaking, to persevere in a design,
and to work out its execution in the presence of serious obstacles. It cannot
combine its measures with secrecy, and it will not await their conse-
quences with patience. These are qualities which more especially belong
to an individual, or to an aristocracy."
